Fiscal Reaction to Interest Payments-the Case of Serbia by Andrić, Vladimir et al.
Industrija, Vol.44, No.3, 2016 117 
Vladimir Andrić
1
 
Milojko Arsić
2
 
Aleksandra Nojković
3
 
JEL: E4, E6 
DOI:10.5937/industrija44-12031 
UDC: 336.273(497.11) 
336.1/.5 
 Original Scientific Paper 
Fiscal Reaction to Interest Payments-the 
Case of Serbia 
Article history: 
Received: 11 April 2016 
Sent for revision: 29 April 2016 
Received in revised form: 29 July 2016 
Accepted: 2 August 2016 
Available online: 8 October 2016 
  
Abstract: We focus on the response of primary fiscal balance to interest 
payments and borrowing costs on Serbian public debt before, during and in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Our analysis reveals: i) policy 
makers financed up to 50% of each percentage point increase in interest 
payments to GDP ratio with new public debt issuance; ii) the government has 
responded to rising interest payments and borrowing costs by reducing 
primary fiscal balance from the onset of the global financial crisis; iii) the 
response of primary fiscal balance to interest payments mimics the response 
of primary fiscal balance to the costs of borrowing; iv) fiscal austerity 
measures adopted after the breach of fiscal rule for public debt have been 
insufficient to stabilize fiscal policy stance in Serbia. 
Keywords: Serbia, Fiscal Sustainability, Augmented Fiscal Reaction 
Function, Global Financial Crisis, Costs, Debt, Payments. 
Fiskalna reakcija u odnosu na troškove kamata-slučaj Srbije 
Apstrakt: U ovom radu fokusiramo se na reakciju primarnog fiskalnog bilansa 
na troškove kamata i zaduživanja na srpski javni dug pre, tokom i nakon 
izbijanja globalne finansijske krize. Naša analiza otkriva: i) kreatori 
ekonomske politike su finansirali i do 50% ukupnog rasta troškova kamata 
emisijom novog javnog duga; ii) nakon izbijanja globalne finansijske krize 
vlada smanjuje primarni fiskalni bilans uprkos rastu troškova kamata i 
zaduživanja; iii) reakcija primarnog fiskalnog bilansa na troškove kamata 
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oponaša reakciju primarnog fiskalnog bilansa na troškove zaduživanja; iv) 
mere štednje usvojene nakon kršenja fiskalnih pravila za gornju granicu 
javnog duga su se pokazale kao nedovoljne za stabilizaciju javnih finansija u 
Srbiji.  
Ključne reči: Srbija, Fiskalna Održivost, Proširena Funkcija Fiskalne 
Reakcije, Globalna Finansijska Kriza, Troškovi, Dug, Isplate. 
1. Introduction 
We focus on the response of primary fiscal balance to interest payments and 
borrowing costs on Serbian public debt before, during and in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis. Between 2004Q3 and 2014Q3, policy makers in 
Serbia increased primary fiscal balance as share of GDP in a range of 0.50-
1.07 percentage points for each percentage point increase in interest 
payments to GDP ratio. The government, hence, financed up to 50% of each 
percentage point increase in interest payments to GDP ratio with new public 
debt issuance. We contribute this result to myopic behaviour of the Serbian 
government from the onset of the global financial crisis. In particular, the 
government responded to rising interest payments and borrowing costs by 
reducing primary fiscal balance after the global financial crisis unfolded. In 
2012Q1, public debt to GDP ratio breached its fiscal rule limit of 45%, so 
policy makers pushed for numerous fiscal consolidation measures between 
2012Q1 and 2014Q3. The measures were, however, inconsistent and 
unsystematic, so the government was unsuccessful in consolidating its fiscal 
policy stance. Although the response of primary fiscal balance to interest 
payments and borrowing costs had strengthened after 2012Q1, it remained in 
negative territory throughout our sample span. 
Our estimates of fiscal reaction functions (FRFs) provide several novelties to 
the existing literature on fiscal solvency in the case of emerging European 
economies from Central and Eastern Europe. First, we investigate the fiscal 
prudence of the Serbian government not only with respect to public debt, but 
also with respect to interest payments and borrowing costs. Other 
contributions from the literature mainly focus on the solvency of government 
debt, and neglect to analyse the fiscal response to interest payments and 
borrowing costs. Notable exceptions familiar to us are Staehr (2008), Baldi 
and Staehr (2013), Debrun and Kinda (2013) and Mauro et al. (2013). 
Second, we detect a myopic behaviour of the Serbian government from the 
onset of the global financial crisis. We implement the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation algorithm with endogenously determined breakpoints 
proposed in Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, b) to detect 
potential shifts in the response of primary fiscal balance to interest payments 
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and borrowing costs. Our OLS estimates of FRFs with breakpoints, similar to 
the ones in Uctum et al. (2006) and Mauro et al. (2013), detect a regime 
change in the evolution of response of primary fiscal balance to interest 
payments and borrowing costs. The estimated FRFs capture the transition of 
the response from positive before the crisis to negative during and after the 
global financial crisis. In particular, the Ministry of Finance responded to rising 
interest payments and borrowing costs by reducing primary fiscal balance as 
share of GDP after the global financial crisis unfolded. Therefore, policy 
makers in Serbia financed up to 50% of each percentage point increase in 
interest payments to GDP ratio with new public debt issuance between 
2004Q3 and 2014Q3. The use of public debt for financing maturing interest 
expenses sheds new light on why public debt to GDP ratio has exhibited 
upward trend since the outbreak of the global financial meltdown. 
The additional original contribution of this paper is our focus on a single 
transition economy from emerging Europe while other related papers primarily 
operate with panel data sets. Mauro et al. (2013) is the only study from 
aforementioned contributions which uses time series data, but their sample 
does not contain any transition economy from Central and Eastern Europe.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the 
theoretical framework which we use to motivate our econometric analysis. 
Section III comprises of two subsections: the first one documents stylized 
facts in Serbian public finances, while the second one discusses our empirical 
estimates. Section IV concludes by suggesting policy implications and 
avenues for further research. 
2. Theoretical Background 
We present a simple deterministic two-period model of optimal fiscal policy 
which serves as a framework for our subsequent empirical estimates. The 
model follows logic outlined in Barro (1979) and Debrun and Kinda (2013). 
The utility function of the government is: 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑞1) +
1
1+𝛿
𝑈(𝑞2).             (1) 
Utility function from above is time separable with standard neoclassical 
properties 𝑈′ > 0 and 𝑈′′ < 0. In period i the government delivers the quantity 
of primary public spending denoted by 𝑞𝑖(𝑖=1,2), while 𝛿 stands for the discount 
rate of the government. 
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The government budget constraint is: 
{
𝑞1 = 𝜏𝑦 + 𝑏1 − (𝑟 + 𝜔)𝑏0
                 𝑞2 = 𝜏𝑦 − (1 + 𝑟)[(1 − 𝜔)𝑏0 + 𝑏1]
           (2) 
in which 𝜏 represents a proportional fixed tax rate, as in the tax smoothing 
model of Barro (1979), while 𝑦  represents exogenously determined output 
level. 𝑏0 is exogenously inherited amount of public debt at the beginning of 
the first period, while 𝑏1 is the amount of public debt at the end of the first 
period, i.e., at the beginning of the second period. The market interest rate 
paid on public debt is denoted by 𝑟 , while 𝜔, 𝜔 ∈ [0,1] , stands for the 
proportion of an initial debt level 𝑏0 to be amortized during the first period. 
The government maximizes its utility from equation (1) given the budget 
constraint from equation (2). The maximization problem of the government is: 
max𝑞𝑖,𝑖=1,2 𝑈 = max𝑞𝑖,𝑖=1,2 {𝑈(𝑞1) +
1
1+𝛿
𝑈(𝑞2)}.        (3) 
From government budget constraint stated in equation (2), we express 𝑞2 as a 
function of 𝑞1: 
𝑞2 = 𝜏𝑦(2 + 𝑟) − (1 + 𝑟)𝑞1 − 𝑏0(1 + 𝑟)
2.           (4) 
The maximization problem of the government now becomes a function of only 
one variable 𝑞1: 
max𝑞1 𝑈 = max𝑞1 {𝑈(𝑞1) +
1
1+𝛿
𝑈[𝜏𝑦(2 + 𝑟)] − (1 + 𝑟)𝑞1 − 𝑏0(1 + 𝑟)
2}.   (5) 
The optimality condition with respect to 𝑞1 is: 
𝑈′(𝑞1
∗) = 𝜌𝑈′(𝑞2
∗)            (6) 
in which 𝜌 = (1 + 𝑟) (1 + 𝛿)⁄  represents a deterministic discount factor of the 
government. 
By differentiating the optimality condition in (6) with respect to 𝑏0 and 𝑟, we 
obtain the following comparative statics derivatives: 
𝑑𝑞1
∗
𝑑𝑏0
=
𝑑𝑏1
∗
𝑑𝑏0
= −
(𝑟+𝜔)𝑈′′(𝑞1
∗)−𝜌(1+𝑟)(1−𝜔)𝑈′′(𝑞2
∗)
𝑈′′(𝑞1
∗)+𝜌(1+𝑟)𝑈′′(𝑞2
∗)
           (7) 
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𝑑𝑞1
∗
𝑑𝑟
=
𝑑𝑏1
∗
𝑑𝑟
= −
(1+𝛿)−1𝑈′(𝑞2
∗)−𝜌((1−𝜔)𝑏0+𝑏1
∗)𝑈′′(𝑞2
∗)+𝑏0𝑈
′′(𝑞1
∗)
𝑈′′(𝑞1
∗)+𝜌(1+𝑟)𝑈′′(𝑞2
∗)
.        (8) 
The signs of comparative statics derivatives in (7) and (8) depend only on the 
signs of corresponding numerators, since the expressions in both 
denominators are always negative. The signs are ambiguous, and they 
depend crucially on the values of debt amortization parameter 𝜔  and 
subjective discount rate  𝛿 . The signs are positive for low values of these 
parameters, while they are negative if these parameters take on higher 
values. In particular, if the debt amortization parameter 𝜔 is close to 0, then 
the government shifts the amortization of inherited debt 𝑏0 to the second 
period. On the other hand, if debt amortization parameter 𝜔 is close to 1, then 
the government amortizes almost entire inherited public debt 𝑏0 in the first 
period. The behaviour of the government in the first case stems from low 
values of its discount rate 𝛿, while the behaviour of the government in the 
second case stems from high values of its discount rate  𝛿. Intuitively, low 
values of discount rate  𝛿  imply relatively higher marginal utility of primary 
public spending  𝑞1
∗  in comparison to marginal utility of primary public 
spending  𝑞2
∗ , while high values of discount rate 𝛿  imply relatively higher 
marginal utility of primary public spending 𝑞2 
∗  in comparison to marginal utility 
of primary public spending 𝑞1
∗. In the case of low 𝛿, the government values 
primary public spending from the first period relatively more than primary 
public spending from the second period, so it increases its spending in the 
first period even when faced with increasing public debt and interest rate. The 
behaviour of the government is, therefore, myopic from the standpoint of fiscal 
solvency. In the case of high 𝛿 , the government values primary public 
spending from the second period relatively more than primary public spending 
from the first period, so it decreases its spending in the first period when faced 
with increasing public debt and interest rate. The behaviour of the government 
is, therefore, sustainable from the standpoint of fiscal solvency. 
Bohn (1998) was the first to estimate the response of primary fiscal balance to 
public debt while controlling for transitory government spending and output 
fluctuations. Strictly positive, and at least linear, response of primary fiscal 
balance to public debt is sufficient for intertemporal budget constraint to hold. 
Intuitively, increasing primary fiscal balance will reverse any upward 
movement in public debt, so, consequently, public debt becomes mean-
reverting. Ghosh et al. (2011) argue how Bohn’s criterion represents weak 
solvency criterion, since it does not rule out an ever-increasing debt-to-GDP 
ratio. They propose a stricter solvency test which restricts public debt to 
converge to some finite proportion of GDP. For a given debt target, and a 
given inherited debt level, interest payments-to-GDP ratio is a proxy for debt 
stabilising primary fiscal balance. Stated differently, if the primary fiscal 
balance increases proportionally with interest payments, both in ratio to GDP, 
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then debt-to-GDP will stabilize at some predetermined debt level. If the 
primary fiscal balance, on the other hand, increases faster than interest 
payments, both in ratio to GDP, then debt-to-GDP will converge to some 
lower debt level. Finally, if the primary fiscal balance does not keep pace with 
rising interest payments, both in ratio to GDP, then there will be a debt level 
above which public debt dynamics becomes explosive. Therefore, the 
response of primary fiscal balance to interest payments in a given FRF points, 
indirectly, to the use of public debt in covering maturing interest expenses. In 
particular, the response of primary fiscal balance to interest payments which 
equals 1 in a given FRF indicates no use of public debt in covering maturing 
interest expenses. On the other hand, the response of primary fiscal balance 
to interest payments which is above 1 in a given FRF indicates the use of 
primary fiscal balance in covering both interest expenses and public debt. 
Finally, the response of primary fiscal balance to interest payments which is 
below 1 in a given FRF indicates the use of public debt in covering maturing 
interest expenses. 
3. Empirical Evidence 
Before we bring the model from the previous section to the data, we acquaint 
the reader with major trends in Serbian public finances before, during and in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis.   
3.1. Data and Trends 
Our research uses official quarterly time series data from Ministry of Finance, 
National Bank of Serbia and the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia.
4
 
The sample covers the period between 2004Q3 and 2014Q3. Fig. 1 shows 
two main sub-periods in the dynamics of fiscal balance, primary fiscal balance 
and public debt in Serbia. The first sub-period refers to the period before the 
crisis, and spans from 2004Q3 to 2008Q3. The second sub-period refers to 
the period during and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, and spans 
from 2008Q4 to 2014Q3.  
Following earlier contributions in the literature on fiscal reaction functions, we 
use overall, cyclically unadjusted, primary fiscal balance as an indicator of 
                                                                
4
 We seasonally adjust our time series data with TRAMO/SEATS procedure in accordance with 
Eurostat (2015) and IMF (2001) guidelines. All data, both seasonally unadjusted and adjusted, 
are available from the authors upon request. Fiscal data pertain to the general government, 
except for public debt which is recorded at central government level due to data unavailability. 
Central government debt, however, constitutes 98% of general government debt between 
2004Q3 and 2014Q3, as the Ministry of Finance (2015) reports. 
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fiscal policy stance.
5
 We build on theoretical models of Barro (1979) and 
Debrun and Kinda (2013) in our choice of fiscal policy stance indicator. This 
choice is also consistent with the model-based sustainability analysis 
developed in Bohn (1998), and later on outlined in Mendoza and Ostry (2008) 
and Lamé et al. (2014). The use of overall primary fiscal balance enables us 
to assess the overall response of fiscal policy stance to changes in public 
debt, interest payments and borrowing costs. Some authors, however, use 
cyclically adjusted primary fiscal balance as the proper measure of fiscal 
policy stance, following the seminal work of Gali and Perotti (2003).
6
 We, on 
the other hand, find this particular measure less satisfying in assessing overall 
fiscal sustainability, since it only captures the discretionary intentions of policy 
makers in conducting fiscal policy. The rise of aforementioned fiscal 
magnitudes can hinder economic growth which, in turn, can lead to lower 
government revenues and lower overall primary fiscal balance. Although there 
is a large body of literature which documents negative correlation between 
public debt and economic growth, this research question is beyond the scope 
of our paper.
7
 Finally, even if the previously stated assertions do not hold, it is 
comforting to note that the discrepancy between overall and cyclically 
adjusted primary fiscal balance in the case of Serbia is not large. In particular, 
Arsić et al. (2013) document how 80% of variations in overall primary fiscal 
balance is due to discretionary fiscal policy changes. In other words, the 
changes in structural, cyclically adjusted, primary fiscal balance govern 
approximately 80% of variations in overall, cyclically unadjusted, primary fiscal 
balance. 
Fiscal balance in Serbia has recorded a deficit before, during and in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, the only exception being the period 
from the end of 2004 until the end of 2005. In particular, between 2004Q3 and 
2005Q4, fiscal balance in Serbia achieved a surplus of around 0.7% of GDP, 
on average. The transient surplus in Serbian public finances was a result of 
fiscal consolidation package of over 5% of GDP between 2002 and 2005 
(Cocozza et al., 2011). IMF’s Extended Arrangement ensured the successful 
implementation of fiscal stabilization program. In 2006Q1, immediately after 
the Arrangement had expired, fiscal balance in Serbia entered into the 
negative territory.  
                                                                
5
 The paper of Bohn (1998) is the first to measure the overall fiscal sustainability by linking the 
changes in primary fiscal balance to changes in public debt. Other papers from the literature, 
most notably Bohn (2005), Uctum et al. (2006), Mendoza and Ostry (2008), Staehr (2008), Ghosh 
et al. (2011), Mauro et al. (2013), Debrun and Kinda (2013) and Baldi and Staehr (2013), followed 
the same approach in assessing overall fiscal sustainability. 
6
 Plödt and Reicher (2014) document the great number of studies which follow the approach of 
Gali and Perotti (2003). See Plödt and Reicher (2014, page 4, footnote number 5). 
7
 The negative effect of high and increasing public debt on growth in transition economies can be 
even larger than a standard crowding-out effect, if it leads to policy uncertainty, foreign capital 
outflows, higher interest rates and higher probability of default.   
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Figure 1. Fiscal Balance, Primary Fiscal Balance and Public Debt in Serbia, 
2004Q3-2014Q3 
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Sources: Ministry of Finance and the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 
Between 2006Q1 and 2008Q4, fiscal balance in Serbia fluctuated around its 
mean value of around -2 % of GDP, which is in line with the average actual 
fiscal deficit in the EU-10 economies during 2008.
8
 The deteriorating fiscal 
stance in Serbia after the completion of IMF’s surveillance program points to 
the weakness of fiscal institutions in Serbia. In particular, policy makers in 
Serbia conducted procyclical expansionary fiscal policy in 2006, 2007 and 
2008. Large privatizations of state owned banks and enterprises, along with 
the absorption boom led surge in indirect revenues, motivated the government 
to accompany cuts in marginal tax rate on wages with increases in public 
wages and non-taxable wage threshold. Arsić et al. (2013) argue how these 
measures increased structural fiscal deficit in Serbia by approximately 1.7% of 
GDP. In addition, policy makers approved several unprecedented hikes in 
public wages and pensions of around 2.5% of GDP during 2008 (Arsić et al., 
2013). 
At the beginning of the second sub-period, the government witnessed sharp 
decline in public revenues due to the arrival of the global financial crisis to 
Serbia. Moreover, the government signed a trade agreement with the EU 
which resulted in the overall loss of custom revenues of around 1.5% of GDP 
(Arsić et al., 2013). Between 2009Q1 and 2011Q1, the government froze 
public wages and pensions, and introduced several other austerity measures 
                                                                
8
 Average actual fiscal deficit in the EU-10 countries in 2008 amounted to 2.8% of GDP (Arsić et 
al., 2013). EU-10 countries include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovak Republic.  
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on both sides of the budget.
9
 These measures resulted in a relatively lower 
average fiscal deficit in Serbia in comparison to other transition economies 
from Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, actual fiscal deficit in Serbia 
averaged around 4.5% of GDP between 2009 and 2010, while EU-10 
economies recorded an average fiscal deficit of around 6% of GDP in the 
same period. The effects of these measures were, however, largely reversed 
during 2011 when the government had abandoned fiscal austerity measures 
and introduced a fiscal decentralization package which widened structural 
fiscal deficit in Serbia for approximately 1.7% of GDP (Arsić et al., 2013). 
Therefore, between 2011Q2 and 2014Q4, the fiscal deficit in Serbia averaged 
around 5.9% of GDP, while EU-10 economies recorded an average fiscal 
deficit of around 3.4% of GDP, as a direct consequence of introduced fiscal 
austerity measures. 
The dynamics of public debt-to-GDP ratio has also exhibited two distinctive 
patterns throughout our sample span-one before, and the other during and in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Although rapid economic growth, 
absorption boom and politically motivated debt write-offs pushed debt-to-GDP 
ratio downward for approximately 30 percentage points between 2004Q3 and 
2008Q3, debt to GDP ratio in Serbia exhibited one of the fastest increases in 
the group of emerging European economies from the onset of the global 
financial crisis. Widening fiscal balance pushed public debt to GDP ratio 
upwards for approximately 40 percentage points between 2008Q4 and 
2014Q3-from around 30% of GDP in 2008Q3 to approximately 68% of GDP in 
2014Q3. 
As public debt grows, so do interest payments and effective borrowing 
costs.
10
 Fig. 2 depicts interest payments as % of GDP along with the implied 
effective interest rate on Serbian government debt between 2004Q3 and 
2014Q3.
11
 The two series are highly correlated with the sample correlation 
coefficient of 0.92. The dynamics of these magnitudes exhibits highly 
persistent upward trend with several structural shifts. First, between 2004Q3 
and 2005Q2, interest payments and borrowing costs primarily decreased due 
to IMF’s fiscal stabilization program which encompassed, among other 
measures, several debt reduction packages from international creditors. 
International creditors also provided the refinancing of older debts with much 
favourable repayment arrangements. In addition, international financial 
organizations provided concessional loans with longer grace periods and 
                                                                
9
 For a detail account of these measures see Fiscal Council (2012), Arsić et al. (2013) and 
Ministry of Finance (2015). 
10
 The sample correlation coefficient between public debt and interest payments equals 0.87, 
while the correlation coefficient between public debt and borrowing costs equals 0.64. 
11
 We compute the implied effective interest rate on Serbian public debt as the ratio of interest 
payments and public debt. We do not operate with government bond yields due to data 
unavailability. 
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interest rates below those available on the market. Second, between 2005Q3 
and 2006Q3, interest payments and borrowing costs primarily increased 
because the government had started issuing bills and notes in the process of 
domestic bond market development (Ministry of Finance, 2015). Third, 
between 2006Q4 and 2008Q3, interest payments and borrowing costs 
primarily decreased due to a breakup between Serbia and Montenegro, and 
due to partial debt write-offs towards the London and Paris international clubs 
of creditors. In addition, the government was not issuing bills and notes in this 
period due to a large inflow of privatization revenues from abroad. Fourth, 
between 2008Q4 and 2014Q3, primarily as a consequence of the global 
financial crisis, interest payments increased from 0.65% to 2.90% of GDP in 
the period under consideration. In the same period, international financial 
organizations reduced concessional lending to Serbia which, coupled with 
higher market interest rate due to the delay of comprehensive fiscal 
consolidation package, pushed borrowing costs upward from 2.29% to 4.26%. 
Figure 2. Interest Payments (% of GDP) and Implied Effective Interest Rate 
(%) on Serbian Public Debt, 2004Q3-2014Q3 
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Sources: Ministry of Finance and the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 
3.2. Results  
This section brings outlined theoretical model from section 2 to the data. First, 
we estimate the linear OLS augmented fiscal reaction function along the lines 
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of Bohn (1998), Debrun and Kinda (2013) and Mauro et al. (2013). Second, 
we model the nonlinearities in the response of primary fiscal balance to 
interest payments before, during and after the global financial crisis by 
following guidelines outlined in Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, 
b). Finally, we investigate whether the shifts in primary fiscal balance 
response to interest payments correspond to the shifts in borrowing costs 
and/or public debt. We also provide numerous sensitivity checks for all 
aforementioned baseline estimates. 
The linear OLS specification for the augmented fiscal reaction function is as 
follows: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛼0𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛼1𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡        (9) 
in which 𝑆𝑡  represents primary fiscal balance, 𝐵𝑡−1  is lagged public debt, 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 are lagged interest payments on public debt, 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡  is transitory 
government spending, 𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 is output gap and 𝜖𝑡 are i.i.d. normal white noise 
residuals with parameters 0 and 𝜎2. 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 is a dummy variable which equals 
1 if 𝑡 > 2008𝑄3, and 0 otherwise, following Berglöf et al. (2009) and Cocozza 
et al. (2011) who date the outbreak of the global financial crisis in Serbia at 
the end of 2008. We express all regressors as shares of GDP, except 𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 
which is in log levels, as in Uctum et al. (2006) and Bohn (2005). In particular, 
we compute 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡  as the detrended values of nominal government 
expenditures, and then divide the obtained transitory component with nominal 
GDP, while we calculate 𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 by detrending the values of log real GDP.
12
 
FRF from equation (9) is closely related to Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing 
model. The tax smoothing model of Barro (1979) implies exogenous 
permanent government spending which determines the level of collected 
taxes. Policy makers fix the tax rate to minimize the administrative costs of tax 
collection and the deadweight cost of taxation. Consequently, transitory 
government spending, as a consequence of political and business cycles, and 
output gap, via its impact on the tax base, are the only non-debt determinants 
of the primary fiscal balance.  
We present the coefficient estimates from equation (9) in Table 1. Table 1 
shows how the estimated response of primary fiscal balance to 1 percentage 
point increase in interest payments is 0.50 percentage points. The estimated 
response is significant at more than 1% significance level. The estimated 
coefficient shows how policy makers in Serbia funded approximately 50% of 
each percentage point increase in interest payments with primary fiscal 
balance, and around 50% with newly issued government debt. We use lagged 
interest payments and public debt as explanatory variables in equation (9) for 
                                                                
12
 We use Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with smoothing parameter set to 1600 in both calculations. 
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two reasons. First, we circumvent potential endogeneity between 
contemporaneous interest payments, public debt and the unexplained 
variations of primary fiscal balance. In addition, by controlling for public debt 
variations in our FRF, we can isolate the sole response of fiscal policy stance 
to variations in interest expenses. Second, we allow the additional quarter for 
the corrective fiscal actions of the government in repaying maturing interest 
expenses.  
Table 1. Augmented FRF with Interest Payments (period: 2004Q3-2014Q3) 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡. 
𝜇 -1.23** 
0.82                        
(0.57) 
-1.50             
[−2.16] 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 -3.82*** 
0.27                        
(0.26) 
-14.12        
 [−14.43] 
𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 -0.93*** 
0.07                       
(0.07) 
-12.90                
[−13.40] 
𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 8.36* 
7.02                       
(4.87) 
1.19              
 [1.72] 
𝐵𝑡−1 0.02 
0.03                        
(0.02) 
0.75               
 [1.29] 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 0.50*** 
0.39 
(0.17) 
1.29 
[2.89] 
𝑅2 0.93 𝑆. 𝐸. 0.72 
𝐹 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡. 95.95 𝐷𝑊 1.94 
Notes: Estimates are from equation (9). 𝑆𝑡-primary fiscal balance as the dependent variable. 𝜇- 
constant term; 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠-dummy which equals 1 if 𝑡 > 2008𝑄3 , and 0 otherwise; 𝐵𝑡−1-quarter lagged 
public debt; 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1-quarter lagged interest payments; 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡-transitory government spending; 
𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡-output gap. Variables expressed in % of GDP, except 𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 which is in log levels. Newey-
West HAC standard errors with Bartlett kernel and lag window of size 4 are given in (). Newey-
West HAC 𝑡-statistics are given in []. OLS estimation method. *** 1% level significance, ** 5% 
level significance, * 10% level significance for HAC standard errors. 
The estimated response for lagged public debt equals 0.02. The estimated 
coefficient, however, is not significant at even 10% significance level. The 
insignificance of the estimated response points to insolvency of public debt 
management in Serbia between 2004Q3 and 2014Q3.
13
 
The global financial crisis has increased the share of primary fiscal deficit in 
GDP by 3.82 percentage points. The estimated coefficient for the dummy 
variable 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  in Table 1 is significant at 1% level. The percentage point 
increase (decrease) of general government expenditures as % of GDP from 
its overall trend level reduced (increased) the share of primary fiscal balance 
                                                                
13
 The reader should interpret this result cautiously, since the correlation coefficient between 
public debt and interest payments of 0.87 points to severe multicollinearity issues. 
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in GDP by 0.93 percentage points. The estimated coefficient for 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡  in 
Table 1 is also significant at 1% level. 
The estimated coefficient for output gap measures the automatic response of 
primary fiscal balance to business cycle fluctuations. The percentage point 
increase (decrease) of real GDP from its potential level increased (reduced) 
the share of primary fiscal balance in GDP by 0.08 percentage points. The 
estimated cyclical response is significant at 10% level. Although the significant 
positive response points to pro-cyclicality of primary fiscal balance in Serbia, 
its magnitude is more in line with a-cyclical explanation of fiscal policy 
behaviour. The size of the estimated cyclical response shows the inability of 
output fluctuations to increase the share of primary fiscal balance in GDP. In 
particular, for the primary fiscal balance to increase its share in GDP for 1 
percentage point, output should deviate upward from its overall trend level by 
more than 10 percentage points. This estimate does not change even when 
we define output gap as % of potential output. To provide additional 
robustness check, we have also used real GDP growth instead of output gap. 
The estimated coefficient of -0.003 is not significant at even 10% significance 
level, once again supporting our baseline claims. Our results reinforce the 
findings of Arsić et al. (2013) who contribute 80% of overall fiscal deficit to 
structural discretionary measures, predominantly on the expenditure side of 
the budget, and only 20% of overall fiscal deficit to business cycle and other 
macroeconomic considerations. In addition, the results are robust with respect 
to simultaneity bias, since the correlations with residuals from equation (9) are 
indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, the size and significance of cyclical 
response do not change when we instrument 𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 with its lagged value.
14
 
Putted differently, the absence of simultaneity between primary fiscal balance 
and output gap shows unsynchronized fiscal policy conduct in Serbia between 
2004Q3 and 2014Q3 with respect to business cycle fluctuations. In particular, 
the positive effects of fiscal consolidation between 2002-2005 were largely 
reversed by the negative effects of procyclical fiscal expansion in 2006, 2007 
and 2008. Similarly, the positive effects of fiscal consolidation in 2009 and 
2010, were largely reversed by the fiscal developments in 2011, 2012 and 
2013. 
The estimation of long-run variance in Newey-West HAC correction might be 
biased in small samples such as ours. Plödt and Reicher (2014) link the 
autocorrelation in primary fiscal balance with the degree of cyclicality in fiscal 
policy. If primary fiscal balance is assumed to respond slowly to output gap 
due to implementation lags in discretionary fiscal policy, then the specification 
                                                                
14
 The estimated coefficient equals 11.46, and it is significant at 12% level. We do not report 
these, and many others, sensitivity checks throughout our paper in separate equations and tables 
to preserve journal space. All reported results are, however, available from the authors upon 
request. 
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for FRF should model autocorrelation in primary fiscal balance with an 
appropriate lag of the dependent variable. On the other hand, if primary fiscal 
balance is assumed to respond quickly to output gap due to automatic 
adjustments, then the specification for FRF should model autocorrelation in 
primary fiscal balance with an appropriate AR term for the residuals of primary 
fiscal balance. Two alternative modelling approaches confirm our baseline 
estimates in Table 1. In particular, we have alternatively modelled the 
autocorrelation in primary fiscal balance by: i) experimenting with the first four 
lags of the dependent variable 𝑆𝑡; ii) fitting AR terms up to the 4
th
 order to the 
unexplained component of primary fiscal balance from equation (9). Two 
findings are particularly worth emphasizing. First, only coefficient for 𝑆𝑡−3 is 
significant at 10% level, and equals 0.13 The significance of the third lag 
points to very slow changes in primary fiscal balance as a consequence of 
discretionary fiscal policy measures, while the size of the estimated coefficient 
implies very flexible fiscal reaction function for primary fiscal balance, as in 
Staehr (2008) and Baldi and Staehr (2013). Although all other estimates 
remain very close to those from equation (9), fourth lag autocorrelation is still 
present at 10% significance level. Second, only AR (4) specification for the 
residuals of primary fiscal balance from equation (9) is significant at 10% 
level, and the estimated AR (4) term equals -0.34. The size of the estimated 
AR term shows how 1 percentage point shock in 𝑆𝑡  due to automatic 
adjustments reduces the share of primary fiscal balance in GDP for 
approximately 0.3 percentage points after one year. Although all other 
estimates again remain very close to those from equation (9), autocorrelation 
in the residuals of primary fiscal balance still perseveres.
15
 
Following Mendoza and Ostry (2008), we have also experimented with trade 
balance and inflation rate as additional control variables in equation (9). The 
inclusion of trade balance as control variable is important for encompassing 
the influence of indirect taxes on fiscal policy stance. In particular, increasing 
trade deficits imply higher indirect taxes, most notably higher VAT and custom 
revenues, as a consequence of higher imports. The inclusion of the inflation 
rate as control variable is important for encompassing potential inflation tax 
effects. In particular, higher inflation rate implies higher nominal incomes 
which, in turn, might imply higher nominal income taxes. The response to 
interest payments, significant at 5% level, jumps to 0.66 in the specification 
with trade balance, although the coefficient for trade balance fails to attain 
statistical significance. The response to interest payments, significant at 5% 
level, jumps to 0.77 in the specification with inflation rate, although the 
                                                                
15
 A meticulous reader might wonder whether our estimates from this paragraph are just a mere 
consequence of residual seasonality present in our time series data. We have tested for the 
presence of residual seasonality within X-ARIMA procedure, according to the ESS 
(Eurostat,2015) and QNA (IMF, 2001) guidelines. The tests within X-ARIMA procedure reject the 
presence of residual seasonality.  
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coefficient for inflation rate fails to attain statistical significance. All other 
estimates in both specifications have the same size, sign and statistical 
significance as those in Table 1. The inclusion of additional controls, hence, 
does not change our baseline estimates in Table 1, which provides further 
evidence for their robustness.  
In the case of Serbia, privatization proceeds, which were particularly high 
between 2006Q4 and 2008Q3, also represent an important potential control 
variable. Policy makers had used these proceeds to finance fiscal deficits 
which altered a standard debt-surplus relationship in the intertemporal 
government budget constraint. Privatization proceeds influenced, hence, 
interest payments indirectly via their influence on public debt accumulation. 
Since our FRF specification controls for public debt and interest payments 
variations, we have, therefore, indirectly controlled for the great majority of 
variations in privatization proceeds as well. 
Lamé et al. (2014) argue how estimates of FRFs are difficult to interpret when 
the primary fiscal balance to GDP ratio is stationary, while public debt and 
interest payments are (near) unit root processes.
16
 The error term is most 
likely correlated with the evolution of public debt and interest payments. The 
estimators for public debt and interest payments, hence, have nonstandard 
asymptotic distributions in finite samples. The finite sample bias is present 
even when the regressors are instrumented with their lagged values. Lamé et 
al. (2014) propose a parametric correction for the elimination of this potential 
finite sample bias by adding additional lags of public debt and interest 
payments in FRF.
17
 They estimate the FRF specification of the following 
general type:  
𝑆𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛾 𝐵𝑡−2 + 𝛿 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜃 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−2 +  𝜖𝑡 
= 𝜇 + 𝛼 + ( 𝛽 + 𝛾 ) 𝐵𝑡−1 − 𝛾 𝛥 𝐵𝑡−1 + (𝛿 + 𝜃)𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1– 𝜃𝛥 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 +
    + 𝜖𝑡                          (10) 
where 𝜇 represents the vector of control variables. 
We follow the advice of Lamé et al. (2014) and augment equation (9) with 
lagged first differences of public debt and interest payments. The primary 
                                                                
16
 First lag autocorrelation coefficient for both public debt and interest payments equals 0.91. The 
results of unit root tests are inconclusive. Primary fiscal balance, on the other hand, is trend 
stationary, so we do not test for the cointegration between the two series. 
17
 Lamé et al. (2014) also propose a nonparametric correction to the heterogeneous persistence 
between primary fiscal balance on one hand, and public debt and interest payments on the other. 
The nonparametric approach is, however, only valid under the assumption of uncorrelated 
primary fiscal balance, a condition not satisfied throughout our sample span. 
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fiscal balance response to interest payments equals 0.57, and it is almost 
identical to the baseline estimate in Table 1. The estimated coefficient is 
significant at 5% level. Included first differences of public debt and interest 
payments are insignificant at 10% level, while all other estimates have the 
same size, sign and statistical significance as in Table 1. The results are 
consistent with baseline estimates, most probably because aforementioned 
small sample bias is negligible in our case. In particular, the correlation 
coefficient between the error term and public debt is only 0.004, while the 
correlation coefficient between the error term and interest payments is -0.007. 
An alternative way to approach the problem of different persistence between 
primary fiscal balance, public debt and interest payments is to include time 
trends as additional explanatory variables in equation (9). The included terms 
should take into account influences on primary fiscal balance which are not 
captured with existing control variables. In particular, we have experimented 
with linear and quadratic time trends. These specifications, however, yield 
somewhat different results with respect to baseline estimates in Table 1. The 
primary fiscal balance response in a FRF with linear time trend jumps to 1.07 
(1% level significance), while the included linear time trend, significant at 1% 
level, is economically insignificant and equals only -0.08. When we 
experiment with a quadratic time trend, the primary fiscal balance response 
drops to 0.88 (1% level significance), but the included linear and quadratic 
trend terms are insignificant at 10% level. In both cases, all other coefficient 
estimates, in general, have the same size, sign and statistical significance as 
in Table 1. 
The reported estimates from the previous passage, at least when we focus on 
a FRF with linear time trend, show how primary fiscal balance has increased 
proportionally with interest payments-to-GDP ratio. This result implies an 
absence of self-generating public debt issued to finance maturing interest 
expenses between 2004Q3 and 2014Q3. To shed more light on this issue, we 
dissect the evolution of primary fiscal balance response in aforementioned 
period to see whether the response changed or remained fairly constant. In 
addition, theoretical framework from Section 2 is ambiguous with respect to 
the sign of primary fiscal balance response, i.e., the response can be positive 
or negative. We explore, hence, the possibility of a non-linear relationship 
between the interest bill and primary fiscal balance by tracing the evolution of 
response across different regimes and sub-periods. 
We follow OLS estimation algorithm with endogenously determined 
breakpoints proposed in Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, b) to 
detect potential shifts in the response of primary fiscal balance to interest 
payments. In particular, we estimate the following specification for FRF: 
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𝑆𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛼0𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1(2004𝑄4−2008𝑄4) +
         +𝛼4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1(2009𝑄1−2012𝑄1) + 𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1(2012𝑄2−2014𝑄3) + 𝜖𝑡 .        (11)  
The first break date occurred in 2008Q4, while the second break date 
occurred in 2012Q1. We follow the guidelines outlined in Bai and Perron 
(1998, 2003 a, b) in determining the number and location of potential break 
points.
18
 The 95% confidence interval for the first break date is [2008𝑄2 −
2009𝑄2] , while the 95% confidence interval for the second break date is 
[2011𝑄2 − 2012𝑄4]. We calculate the confidence intervals for the case of 
trending regressors as in Bai (1997), according to the formula [?̂?𝑖 − [𝑐/?̂?𝑖] − 1,
?̂?𝑖 + [𝑐/?̂?𝑖] + 1 ], in which ?̂?𝑖  is the estimated break date, [𝑐/?̂?𝑖] is the integer 
part of 𝑐/?̂?𝑖, 𝑐 is the 97.5th quintile from the symmetric case CDF for which 
𝑐 = 11 and ?̂?𝑖 = ((?̂?1 − ?̂?2)
2𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡
2
?̂?𝑖−1
)/𝜎𝜖𝐻𝐴𝐶
2  is a scale factor with ?̂?1 , ?̂?2 
and 𝜎𝜖𝐻𝐴𝐶
2  defined as the interest payments coefficient before the break point, 
interest payments coefficient after the break point and the HAC corrected 
estimated variance of 𝜖𝑡 from (11), respectively. The use of symmetric CDF is 
appropriate, since the model’s residuals are stationary on the whole sample. 
The results of both ADF and KPSS test confirm this finding.
19
 Moreover, our 
results do not change if we allow heterogeneous errors across break dates. 
We outline the results of estimation in Table 2. First, the estimate for transitory 
government spending is identical to the one in Table 1. Second, the 
coefficient for output gap jumps in terms of magnitude with respect to estimate 
in Table 1. The estimated coefficient is, however, still small to imply more 
substantial economic influence on fiscal stance in Serbia. Third, the response 
for public debt jumps to 0.05, simultaneously gaining statistical significance at 
5% level. The obtained estimate is identical to the one in Andrić et al. (2016) 
who focus solely on the fiscal prudence of public debt between 2004Q3 and 
2014Q3.  
Fourth, before the global financial crisis, the government responded to each 
percentage point increase in interest payments with 1.69 percentage point 
                                                                
18
 First, we specify the upper bound for potential number of breaks, i.e., we determine the minimal 
regime length by setting the value of trimming percentage 𝜖. If autocorrelation is present in the 
data generating process, Bai and Perron (2003a, b) advise the use of 𝜖 of at least 20%. Given our 
sample size, we set the value of 𝜖 to 25% which corresponds to a minimal regime length of 10 
quarters. Second, we implement double maximum tests 𝑈𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑊𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 from Bai and Perron 
(1998) to see if at least one break is present, given the 𝜖-prespecified upper bound for potential 
number of breaks. Third, given the presence of at least one break, we apply a sequential test of 
ℓ + 1 versus ℓ globally determined breaks, as in Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, b). The described 
3-step procedure yields two breakpoints, the one in 2008Q4 and the other in 2012Q1.  
19
 ADF test statistic with intercept equals -5.43, while the corresponding KPSS test statistic equals 
0.05. The stationarity of the residuals from equation (11) also suggests that the number and 
location of estimated break points corresponds to those of the “true“ model. Moreover, the 
number and location of estimated break points is robust with respect to different algorithms 
proposed in Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, b).  
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increase in primary fiscal balance. The response is significant at 1% level, and 
it is, at least partially, influenced by public debt write-offs by the international 
creditors in 2005, 2006 and 2007.  
The solvency of the government with respect to interest payments, however, 
deteriorated sharply between 2009Q1 and 2012Q1. In particular, the primary 
fiscal balance response dropped to -1.77 percentage points for each 
percentage point increase in interest payments to GDP ratio. Putted 
differently, for each percentage point increase in interest payments to GDP 
ratio from the onset of the global financial crisis, the government reduced 
primary fiscal balance for more than 1 percentage point, thus accelerating the 
deterioration of its fiscal policy stance. The drop-in response, significant at 1% 
level, is primarily due to: the rebalancing of the economy towards exports and 
the associated decline in indirect government revenues; the loss of custom 
revenues of around 1.5% of GDP due to a signed 2008 EU trade agreement; 
hikes in public wages and pensions of around 2.5% of GDP during 2008; 
vertical fiscal imbalances of around 1.7% of GDP created in 2011 as a 
consequence of populistic fiscal decentralization package.
20
 
Although the government introduced numerous fiscal austerity measures 
between 2012Q1 and 2014Q3, these ad hoc measures were insufficient to 
stabilize fiscal policy stance in Serbia. Therefore, public debt to GDP ratio 
breached its fiscal rule upper limit of 45% in 2012Q1, despite the government 
had kept nominal public wages and pensions frozen during 2009 and 2010. 
Therefore, the response of primary fiscal balance to interest payments, 
though higher by approximately 1 percentage point after the fiscal rule breach, 
still remained in negative territory. In particular, the response, significant at 
10% level, averaged -0.65 between 2012Q1 and 2014Q3. The improvement 
in the response of primary fiscal balance to interest payments is primarily due 
to: the increase in standard VAT rate from 18% to 20%; the increase in 
corporate income tax rate from 10% to 15%; increases in excise taxes on 
tobacco, oil and oil derivatives; slower than inflation indexation scheme for 
public wages and pensions; ad hoc public sector hiring freezes and the 
additional taxation of monthly governmental salaries which exceeded 60.000 
RSD during 2014.
21
 The primary fiscal balance response remained negative, 
however, because the effects of aforementioned measures were largely 
reversed due to higher local purchases of around 0.7% of GDP in 2012 and 
ailouts of state owned banks and enterprises of around 1% of GDP in 2013.
22
 
                                                                
20
 For a more detailed account of these measures see Arsić et al. (2013) and Cocozza et al. 
(2011). 
21
 For a more detailed account of these measures see Fiscal Council (2012) and Ministry of 
Finance (2015). 
22
 For a more detailed account of these measures see Arsić et al. (2013) and Ministry of Finance 
(2015). 
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Table 2. Augmented FRF with Interest Payments Shifts (period: 2004Q3-
2014Q3) 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡. 
𝜇 -4.12*** 
0.91 
(0.77) 
-4.50 
[−5.34] 
𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 -0.93*** 
0.07 
(0.07) 
-13.45 
[−13.55] 
𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 14.73* 
7.45 
(7.49) 
1.98 
[1.97] 
𝐵𝑡−1 0.05** 
0.03 
(0.02) 
2.12 
[2.38] 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1(2004𝑄4−2008𝑄4) 1.69*** 
0.51 
(0.44) 
3.34 
[3.88] 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1(2009𝑄1−2012𝑄1) -1.77*** 
0.52 
(0.42) 
-3.43 
[−4.19] 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1(2012𝑄2−2014𝑄3) -0.65* 
0.35 
(0.36) 
-1.84 
[−1.83] 
𝑅2 0.93 𝑆. 𝐸. 0.70 
𝐹 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡. 86.35 𝐷𝑊 1.77 
Notes: Estimates are from equation (11). 𝑆𝑡-primary fiscal balance as the dependent variable. 𝜇-
constant; 𝐵𝑡−1 -lagged public debt; 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 -lagged interest payments; 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 -transitory 
government spending; 𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡-output gap. Variables are in % of GDP, except 𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 which is in log 
levels. Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, b) estimation algorithm with 25% sample trimming 
percentage dates breaks in 2008Q4 and 2012Q1. HAC standard errors with Bartlett kernel and 
window of 4 are given in (). HAC 𝑡-statistics are given in []. *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance 
for HAC standard errors. 
We subject our results in Table 2 to numerous sensitivity checks. Table 3 
summarizes the most important of these sensitivity analyses. First, the use of 
lagged dependent variable up to the 4
th
 lag instead of HAC standard errors 
does not change estimates in Table 2. All lags of the dependent variable are 
insignificant at 10% level. Second, omitted variable F-test statistic rules 
against the inclusion of linear non-breaking time trend in equation (13).
23
 The 
same conclusion holds for the inclusion of breaking trend across breaks in 
2008Q4 and 2012Q1.
24
 In addition, sample splitting across sub-samples 
                                                                
23
 The p-value of the F-statistic equals 0.73. For the subsample 2004Q4-2008Q4, the response of 
primary fiscal balance to interest payments equals 1.64 (p-value=0.00). All other coefficient 
estimates have the same size, sign and statistical significance as those in Table 2. For the 
subsample 2009Q1-2012Q1, the response drops to -1.50 (p-value=0.04). For the subsample 
2012Q2-2014Q3, the response equals -0.41 (p-value=0.55). 
24
 An omitted variable F-test statistic has a p-value of 0.07. The only significant trend term is the 
one for the period 2012Q2-2014Q3. For the subsample 2004Q4-2008Q4, the response of primary 
fiscal balance to interest payments equals 0.89 (p-value=0.03). In great contrast with stylized 
facts about macro-fiscal variables during the global financial crisis, the response of primary fiscal 
balance to interest payments between 2009Q1-2012Q1 jumps to 2.44 (p-value=0.51), pointing 
out to severe overfitting and multicollinearity issues. For the subsample 2012Q2-2014Q3, the 
response equals 0.98 (p-value=0.21). 
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2004Q4-2008Q4, 2009Q1-2012Q1 and 2012Q2-2014Q3 roughly mimics the 
estimates presented in Table 2.
25
 Third, the specification with only one break 
in 2008Q4 also detects the sharp decline in the response of primary fiscal 
balance to interest payments in terms of magnitude and statistical significance 
during and after the global financial crisis. In particular, the response drops 
from 2.43 (p-value=0.00) before the break to -0.49 (p-value=0.33) after the 
break. Other coefficient estimates have the same size, sign and statistical 
significance as those shown in Table 2. Finally, we have allowed for 
simultaneous breaks in public debt and interest payments in equation (11). 
The estimates from the specification with one break in 2008Q4 show identical 
responses before and after the crisis. The responses are equal to 1.00 (1% 
level significance), and they reinforce the claims about the absence of self-
generating public debt in covering maturing interest expenses. The response 
of primary fiscal balance to public debt before the crisis equals 0.08 (p-
value=0.00), while the response after the crisis equals -0.01 (p-value=0.68), 
supporting, to a certain extent, the findings of Andrić et al. (2016).
26
 
Table 3. Sensitivity Analyses for the Primary Fiscal Balance Response to 
Interest Payments 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑/𝐹𝑅𝐹 
𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 
𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 
𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  
𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑠 
𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑠 
08𝑄4 08𝑄4, 12𝑄1 
04𝑄4 − 08𝑄4 1.64*** 0.89** 0.98** 2.43*** 1.0*** 1.01*** 
09𝑄1 − 14𝑄3       - - - -0.49 1.0*** - 
09𝑄1 − 12𝑄1 -1.50** 2.44 -2.44 - - -0.26 
12𝑄2 − 14𝑄3 -0.41 0.98 -0.51 - - 0.53 
Notes: *** 1% level significance, ** 5% level significance, * 10% level significance for HAC 
standard errors. Column Linear Trend corresponds to FRF from equation (11) with linear non-
breaking trend. Column Breaking Trend corresponds to FRF from equation (11) with breaking 
trend across breaks in 2008Q4 and 2012Q1. Column Sample Split corresponds to FRF from 
equation (9) without dummy 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 for subperiods 2004Q4-2008Q4, 2009Q1-2012Q1 and 
2012Q2-2014Q3. Column Crisis Break corresponds to FRF from equation (11) with one break in 
2008Q4. Columns Simultaneous Breaks correspond to FRF from equation (11) with simultaneous 
breaks in public debt and interest payments across one break in 2008Q4 and two breaks in 
2008Q4 and 2012Q1.  
                                                                
25
 For the subsample 2004Q4-2008Q4, the response of primary fiscal balance to interest 
payments equals 0.98 (p-value=0.03). All other coefficient estimates have the same size, sign 
and statistical significance as those in Table 2. For the subsample 2009Q1-2012Q1, the response 
drops to -2.44 (p-value=0.67). Output gap and public debt also lose their statistical significance. 
For the subsample 2012Q2-2014Q3, the response equals -0.51 (p-value=0.38). Output gap and 
public debt again lose their statistical significance. The statistical insignificance of reported 
estimates in the last two sub-samples is probably due to their relatively shorter time span and the 
associated loss of degrees of freedom.   
26
 Andrić et al. (2016) estimate how the response of primary fiscal balance to public debt in Serbia 
has dropped from 0.15 between 2004Q3-2008Q3 to 0.05 between 2008Q4-2014Q3. 
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The estimates from the specification with two breaks, one in 2008Q4 and the 
other in 2012Q1, roughly trace the results shown in Table 2. The response of 
primary fiscal balance to interest payments between 2004Q4-2008Q4 equals 
1.01 (p-value=0.01), while the response to public debt equals 0.07 (p-
value=0.00). The response of primary fiscal balance to interest payments 
between 2009Q1-2012Q1 equals -0.26 (p-value=0.88), while the response to 
public debt equals 0.01 (p-value=0.90). The response of primary fiscal 
balance to interest payments between 2012Q2-2014Q3 equals 0.53 (p-
value=0.3), while the response to public debt equals 0.001 (p-value=0.95). All 
other coefficient estimates have the same size, sign and statistical 
significance as those shown in Table 2. The statistical insignificance of 
aforementioned responses is probably due to overfitting and multicollinearity 
issues.  
The reported robustness results unequivocally point to a drop in the response 
of primary fiscal balance to public debt during and in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. The results are less clear for the response of primary 
fiscal balance to interest payments. As a final robustness check, we 
instrument interest payments with 𝑅𝑡 , an implied effective interest rate on 
Serbian public debt, calculated as a share of interest payments in public debt. 
The instrument is valid, since the interest payments to GDP ratio is just a 
multiple of public debt to GDP ratio and implied effective interest rate. In 
addition, theoretical model from Section 2 operates with interest rates, not 
interest payments, although our choice for interest payments can be justified 
from the standpoint of their importance for overall fiscal sustainability. The 
idea is to examine whether the evolution of the primary fiscal balance 
response to interest payments mimics the underlying evolution of the 
response of primary fiscal balance to implied effective interest rate. Finally, 
the use of implied effective interest rate mitigates potential collinearity issues, 
since its correlation coefficient with public debt is significantly lower than the 
one between interest payments and public debt. In particular, we estimate the 
following FRF with shifts in implied effective interest rate on Serbian public 
debt: 
𝑆𝑡     = 𝜇 + 𝛼0𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑅𝑡−1(2004𝑄4−2008𝑄4) +
         +𝛼4𝑅𝑡−1(2009𝑄1−2012𝑄1) + 𝛼5𝑅𝑡−1(2012𝑄2−2014𝑄3) + 𝜖𝑡    (12) 
The 95% confidence interval for the first break date is [2008𝑄3 − 2009𝑄1], 
while the 95% confidence interval for the second break date is  [2010𝑄4 −
2013𝑄2]. We outline the results of estimation in Table 4. 
Table 4 conveys several important messages. First, the estimates for 
transitory government spending and public debt correspond, as expected, to 
those in Table 2, both in terms of magnitude and in terms of statistical 
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significance. Second, the estimate for output gap is quantitatively very similar 
to the one in Table 2, but the estimated response is insignificant at even 10% 
significance level. The insignificant influence of output gap on primary fiscal 
balance reinforces our claims about a-cyclical primary fiscal balance in 
Serbia. Third, the response of primary fiscal balance to interest payments 
mimics the response of primary fiscal balance to implied effective interest rate 
across estimated break points in terms of size, sign and statistical 
significance. Putted differently, the results in Table 4 with respect to borrowing 
costs re-establish our main finding about myopic behaviour of the Serbian 
government with respect to interest payments during and in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis. 
Table 4. Augmented FRF with Shifts in Implied Effective Interest Rate (period: 
2004Q3-2014Q3) 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡. 
𝜇 -3.87*** 
1.02 
(0.80) 
-3.80 
[-4.80] 
𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 -0.96*** 
0.07 
(0.07) 
-14.24 
[-14.19] 
𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 9.94 
7.31 
(7.43) 
1.36 
[1.34] 
𝐵𝑡−1 0.06*** 
0.02 
(0.02) 
2.97 
[3.32] 
𝑅𝑡−1(2004𝑄4−2008𝑄4) 0.46*** 
0.21 
(0.15) 
2.24 
[3.05] 
𝑅𝑡−1(2009𝑄1−2012𝑄1) -0.93*** 
0.21 
(0.15) 
-4.30 
[-6.05] 
𝑅𝑡−1(2012𝑄2−2014𝑄3) -0.58*** 
0.17 
(0.15) 
-3.46 
[-3.85] 
𝑅2 0.94 𝑆. 𝐸. 0.67 
𝐹 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡. 93.20 𝐷𝑊 2.11 
Notes: Estimates are from equation (12). Bai and Perron OLS breakpoints estimation algorithm 
with fixed breaks in 2008Q4 and 2012Q1. 𝑆𝑡-primary fiscal balance as the dependent variable. 𝜇-
constant term; 𝐵𝑡−1-quarter lagged public debt; 𝑅𝑡−1-quarter lagged implied effective interest rate 
on public debt; 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡-transitory government spending; 𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡-output gap. Variables expressed in 
% of GDP, except 𝑅𝑡−1 which is a ratio of interest payments to public debt (%) and 𝑌𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡  which is 
in log levels. Newey-West HAC standard errors with Bartlett kernel and lag window of size 4 are 
given in (). Newey-West HAC 𝑡-statistics are given in []. *** 1% level significance, ** 5% level 
significance, * 10% level significance for HAC standard errors.  
The results from Table 4 are consistent with numerous robustness checks. 
Table 5 summarizes the most important findings of these sensitivity analyses. 
First, the use of lagged dependent variable up to the 4th lag instead of HAC 
standard errors does not change estimates shown in Table 4. 
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Table 5. Sensitivity Analyses for the Primary Fiscal Balance Response to the 
Costs of Borrowing 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑/𝐹𝑅𝐹 
𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 
𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 
𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  
𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑠 
𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑠 
08𝑄4 08𝑄4, 12𝑄1 
04𝑄4 − 08𝑄4 0.48*** 0.36** 0.37** 0.64*** 0.47*** 0.37** 
09𝑄1 − 14𝑄3 - - - -0.6*** 0.30 - 
09𝑄1 − 12𝑄1 -0.64** 0.83 -0.96 - - -0.39 
12𝑄2 − 14𝑄3 -0.25 0.46 -0.29 - - 0.13 
Notes: *** 1% level significance, ** 5% level significance, * 10% level significance for HAC 
standard errors. Column Linear Trend corresponds to FRF from equation (12) with linear non-
breaking trend. Column Breaking Trend corresponds to FRF from equation (12) with breaking 
trend across breaks in 2008Q4 and 2012Q1. Column Sample Split corresponds to FRF from 
equation (9) with 𝑅𝑡−1 instead of 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 and without dummy 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 for subperiods 2004Q4-
2008Q4, 2009Q1-2012Q1 and 2012Q2-2014Q3. Column Crisis Break corresponds to FRF from 
equation (12) with break in 2008Q4. Columns Simultaneous Breaks correspond to FRF from 
equation (12) with simultaneous breaks in public debt and the costs of borrowing across one 
break in 2008Q4 and two breaks in 2008Q4 and 2012Q1. 
The only significant lags are the second one, 𝑆𝑡−2 = −0.13 (p-value=0.02), 
and the fourth one, 𝑆𝑡−4 = 0.11 (p-value=0.097). All other estimates have the 
same size, sign and statistical significance. Second, omitted variable F-test 
statistic rules against the inclusion of non-breaking time trend in equation 
(12).
27
 The same conclusion holds for the inclusion of breaking trend across 
breaks in 2008Q4 and 2012Q1.
28
 In addition, sample splitting across sub-
samples 2004Q4-2008Q4, 2009Q1-2012Q1 and 2012Q2-2014Q3 roughly 
mimics the estimates presented in Table 4.
29
 Third, the specification with only 
one break in 2008Q4 also detects the sharp decline in the response of 
                                                                
27
  The p-value of the F-statistic equals 0.27. For the subsample 2004Q4-2008Q4, the response 
of primary fiscal balance to the costs of borrowing equals 0.48 (p-value=0.01). All other coefficient 
estimates have the same size, sign and statistical significance as those in Table 4. For the 
subsample 2009Q1-2012Q1, the response drops to -0.64 (p-value=0.03). For the subsample 
2012Q2-2014Q3, the response equals -0.25 (p-value=0.37). 
28
 Omitted variable F-test statistic has a p-value of 0.25. The only significant trend term is the one 
for the period 2012Q2-2014Q3. For the subsample 2004Q4-2008Q4, the response of primary 
fiscal balance to the costs of borrowing equals 0.36 (p-value=0.04). In great contrast with stylized 
facts about macro-fiscal variables during the global financial crisis, the response of primary fiscal 
balance to the costs of borrowing between 2009Q1-2012Q1 jumps to 0.83 (p-value=0.60), 
pointing out to severe overfitting and multicollinearity issues. For the subsample 2012Q2-2014Q3, 
the response equals 0.46 (p-value=0.31).  
29
 For the subsample 2004Q4-2008Q4, the response of primary fiscal balance to the costs of 
borrowing equals 0.37 (p-value=0.05). All other estimates have the same size, sign and statistical 
significance as those in Table 3. For the subsample 2009Q1-2012Q1, the response drops to -
0.96 (p-value=0.65). Output gap and public debt lose their statistical significance. For the 
subsample 2012Q2-2014Q3, the response equals -0.29 (p-value=0.37). Only output gap loses its 
statistical significance in the last subsample.  
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primary fiscal balance to implied effective interest rate in terms of magnitude 
and statistical significance during and after the global financial crisis. In 
particular, the response drops from 0.64 (1% significance) before the break to 
-0.61 (1% significance) after the break, providing additional evidence for the 
drop in response from the beginning of the global financial crisis. Other 
coefficient estimates have the same size, sign and statistical significance as 
those shown in Table 4. Finally, we have tested for simultaneous breaks in 
public debt and implied effective interest rate in equation (12). The estimates 
from the specification with one break in 2008Q4 detect the drop in the 
response of primary fiscal balance to implied effective interest rate during and 
after the global financial crisis. The response before the crisis equals 0.47 
(1% level significance), while the response during and after the crisis equals 
0.30 (p=0.51). The same conclusion holds for the response of primary fiscal 
balance to public debt. The response of primary fiscal balance to public debt 
before the crisis equals 0.11 (p-value=0.00), while the response after the 
crisis equals 0.03 (p-value=0.29). All other estimates have the same size, sign 
and statistical significance. The estimates from the specification with two 
breaks, one in 2008Q4 and the other in 2012Q1, roughly trace the results 
shown in Table 4.
30
 Overall, the additional results point in a direction of 
deteriorating fiscal policy stance with respect to borrowing costs and, 
consequently, interest payments during and in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. Moreover, the response of primary fiscal balance to implied 
effective interest rate and interest payments failed to recover after the fiscal 
rule breach in 2012Q1.  
4. Conclusion 
We estimate the response of primary fiscal balance to interest payments in 
Serbia between 2004Q3 and 2014Q3. Our baseline FRF estimates reach 
several conclusions. First, the response of primary fiscal balance to interest 
payments ranges between 0.50-1.07 percentage points in the entire period 
under consideration. The government, hence, financed up to 50% of each 
percentage point increase in interest payments to GDP ratio with new public 
debt issuance. The result is robust with respect to numerous sensitivity 
checks standard in this line of literature. Second, the global financial crisis 
reduced the share of primary fiscal balance in GDP between 3.50-4.00 
                                                                
30
 The response of primary fiscal balance to the costs of borrowing between 2004Q4-2008Q4 
equals 0.37 (p-value=0.03), while the response to public debt equals 0.08 (p-value=0.00). The 
response of primary fiscal balance to the costs of borrowing between 2009Q1-2012Q1 equals -
0.39 (p-value=0.79), while the response to public debt equals 0.04 (p-value=0.67). The response 
of primary fiscal balance to the costs of borrowing between 2012Q2-2014Q3 equals 0.13 (p-
value=0.73), while the response to public debt equals 0.02 (p-value=0.52). All other coefficient 
estimates have the same size, sign and statistical significance as those shown in Table 3. 
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percentage points. The result is consistent with macro-fiscal stylized facts. 
Third, we document a-cyclicality of primary fiscal balance with respect to 
business cycle fluctuations. Putted differently, automatic adjustments are 
incapable of restoring fiscal solvency in Serbia in the period under our 
consideration.  
We also trace the evolution of the primary fiscal balance response with 
respect to interest payments before, during and in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. The responses differ markedly across sub-periods. Although 
different FRF specifications yield somewhat different estimates, the estimated 
FRFs capture the transition of the response from positive before the crisis to 
negative during and after the global financial crisis. The drop-in response is 
primarily due to the decline in indirect government revenues caused by the 
rebalancing of the economy towards exports, the loss of custom revenues 
associated with the 2008 EU trade agreement, hikes in mandatory public 
spending during 2008 and fiscal decentralization measures adopted in 2011. 
The response has remained in negative territory even after the public debt 
fiscal rule breach in 2012Q1. Putted differently, ad hoc fiscal consolidation 
measures adopted after the breach have been insufficient to restore fiscal 
solvency with respect to interest payments.   
Finally, we have decomposed the evolution of the primary fiscal balance 
response to interest payments to the evolutions of the primary fiscal balance 
response with respect to public debt and implied effective interest rate. Both 
responses dropped sharply since the arrival of the global financial crisis to 
Serbia. Moreover, the response of primary fiscal balance with respect to 
interest payments mimics the response of primary fiscal balance to the costs 
of borrowing. Putted differently, the response of primary fiscal balance to the 
costs of borrowing failed to recover after the public debt fiscal rule breach in 
2012Q1. 
The most important question for future research is how to mitigate further 
deterioration of primary fiscal balance in Serbia. In 2014Q4, the government, 
with the support of the IMF, has launched a 3-year fiscal consolidation 
package. Further analyses must wait additional data to evaluate the 
successfulness of ongoing 3-year fiscal consolidation package. 
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